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NO. 62 DECEMBER 2020 Introduction 
Turkey, the EU and the 
Eastern Mediterranean Crisis 
Militarization of Foreign Policy and Power Rivalry 
Sinem Adar and Ilke Toygür 
The Eastern Mediterranean crisis reflects two overlapping developments. On the one 
hand, it is a manifestation of Turkey’s increasingly assertive posturing in the inter-
national arena. At the same time, it shows the intensity of the geopolitical competi-
tion between Turkey and its adversaries, such as Egypt and the UAE. The EU Member 
States’ different levels and forms of engagement with Turkey obstruct a consensus 
on how to coherently respond to these developments. With accession negotiations 
stalled and discussions focused on areas of conflict rather than cooperation, EU-
Turkey relations are mired in stalemate, while the militarization of foreign policy 
is becoming increasingly prevalent in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. 
 
On 12 October Turkey announced that the 
Oruc Reis – the research ship at the centre 
of a row with Greece and the Republic of 
Cyprus – would continue its operations off 
the southern coast of the Greek island of 
Kastellorizo. The announcement surprised 
many, not least because Ankara had with-
drawn the Oruc Reis to the Turkish coast in 
September and both Greece and Turkey had 
expressed readiness to resume exploratory 
talks under the NATO umbrella. On 15 
October German and French diplomats 
accused Turkey of “provoking” the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and noted that if Ankara 
did not resume the dialogue, it could face a 
tough response from the EU. That warning 
echoed the 1 October European Council 
(EUCO) conclusions on external relations. 
Even though Ankara ordered the Oruc 
Reis back to port on 30 November, the East-
ern Mediterranean crisis will remain a press-
ing issue for various reasons. The mounting 
tension in August showed that a military 
collision between the NATO allies Greece 
and Turkey is not a remote possibility. It 
also exposed Turkey’s increasing inter-
national isolation. While Turkey’s maritime 
boundary conflicts with Greece and Cyprus 
have overlapped with its power rivalry 
against Egypt and the UAE, in recent months 
they have rapidly turned into discord be-
tween Turkey and the EU. At the same 
time, the diverging interests of the Member 
States vis-à-vis Turkey have revealed the 
difficulties the EU faces in adopting a uni-
fied approach towards Ankara. 





Since the 2016 failed coup, Turkish foreign 
policy-making has been driven primarily 
by the readiness to “pull [the country] up by 
its bootstraps”. This shift in Turkey’s secu-
rity outlook is based on two premises. First, 
because of the lack of solidarity during the 
2016 attempted coup and the US partner-
ship with the PYG / YPD in northern Syria 
against ISIS, Ankara believes it can no longer 
fully trust its Western partners. Second, it 
regards the West as in terminal decline ow-
ing to the retreat of liberalism and the power 
vacuum created by the US withdrawal from 
its multilateral commitments under the 
Trump Presidency. These two premises have 
led to a significant shift from the soft-power 
policies of the early 2010s to an overtly con-
frontational foreign policy in the past two 
years on numerous fronts – from Syria to 
(most recently) Nagorno-Karabakh. Ankara 
rejects the regional status quo ante and 
wants to expand its sphere of influence 
from the Caucasus to the MENA region. 
The deployment of Turkish warships to 
watch over drilling activities in Cyprus’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was by no 
means an isolated incident, nor was the 
provocation of Greece through the signing 
in 2019 of an EEZ agreement with the 
Libyan Government of National Accord 
(GNA), which rides roughshod over the 
Greek island of Crete‘s maritime bounda-
ries. The conflict between Turkey, Greece 
and Cyprus over EEZs began in the early 
2000s and intensified with the discovery 
of natural gas reserves in the early 2010s. 
It is only recently, however, that Ankara’s 
approach began to switch from diplomatic 
objections at the UN to the deployment of 
military tactics. Turkish decision-makers see 
their country’s exclusion from the EastMed 
Gas Forum (EMGF) and the aligning of both 
its adversaries (such as the UAE and Egypt) 
and its Western partners with Greece and 
Cyprus as affirming the urgent need for 
self-reliance. 
The ideological backbone of Ankara’s 
actions in the Eastern Mediterranean is the 
“Blue Homeland” (mavi vatan) doctrine, 
according to which naval supremacy is 
necessary to thwart attempts by Greece and 
Cyprus to control the seas surrounding Tur-
key with the backing of the transatlantic 
alliance. At stake are Turkey’s right to mari-
time boundaries, its ownership of hydro-
carbon resources and the status of the Turk-
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is 
recognized only by Turkey. 
The doctrine combines the expression 
of Ankara’s traditional security concerns 
about Northern Cyprus with an emphasis 
on access to resources – a reflection of 
Turkey’s overwhelming energy dependency 
(its 2019 energy imports totalled some 
US$41 billion). It has received widespread 
support – from both left- and right-leaning 
ultranationalists as well as President Erdo-
gan and his aides. This alliance of political 
actors mirrors the reconfiguration within 
the state apparatus in the wake of the 2016 
attempted coup. 
Regional Power Rivalry: 
Turkey versus Egypt and the UAE 
Yet, the alliance is prone to disagreement. 
The architects of the “Blue Homeland” 
doctrine support not only continued mili-
tary posturing against Greece and Cyprus in 
the Eastern Mediterranean but also a mari-
time agreement with Egypt and Israel as 
well as contacts with Bashar al-Assad. That 
stance is supported by the main opposition 
actors. But given that under the leadership 
of Mr Erdogan, the AKP supported (and con-
tinues to support) the Muslim Brotherhood 
during (and after) the Arab Spring, it would 
be difficult to achieve a rapprochement 
with Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi or Al-Assad. 
Against this background of Turkish 
opposition to the regional status quo ante, 
Ankara's confrontational foreign policy in 
the Eastern Mediterranean has contributed 
to turning the crisis into a regional prob-
lem. Cairo feels increasingly threatened by 
Ankara owing to its support of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, senior members of which are 
in exile in Istanbul; and the Turkish mili-
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tary intervention in Libya in early 2020 – 
which changed the balance of power against 
General Haftar, whom Cairo supports – 
only intensified that feeling. Egypt also sees 
Turkish actions in the Eastern Mediterrane-
an as a challenge to its efforts to become a 
regional hub for energy trade and the distri-
bution of liquefied natural gas. 
Cairo is not alone in regarding Turkish 
actions in the Eastern Mediterranean as a 
security threat. The UAE and Turkey sup-
port opposing actors in Syria and Libya. At 
the same time, the UAE considers the close 
relations between Turkey and Qatar – the 
former gave the latter diplomatic and mili-
tary support during the so-called Qatar 
crisis in 2017 – to pose a challenge to its 
regional hegemonic aspirations. 
Since early 2019 the combined impact 
of all these factors has been to turn the 
Eastern Mediterranean crisis into a perfect 
storm. The Mediterranean is now a multi-
stage theatre for demonstrating military 
might and engaging in geopolitical com-
petition. This is evidenced by developments 
ranging from the formation of the EMGF 
and the recent agreement on transforming 
the forum into a Cairo-based regional orga-
nization to the increasing military and 
diplomatic cooperation between Greece, 
Cyprus, France, Egypt and the UAE. 
Responses from within the EU 
Turkey’s confrontational foreign policy – 
which directly affects Greece and Cyprus 
but at the same time has been a source of 
irritation for other EU Member States – has 
intensified efforts within the EU to forge a 
common policy towards Turkey. While the 
Union has become party to the conflict with 
Greece and Cyprus, well-known differences 
between the Member States over their 
engagement with Turkey have come to the 
surface. 
Take, for example, France. In line with 
both its quest for a more independent Euro-
pean foreign policy and its discomfort over 
the change of power in Libya to the GNA’s 
advantage following the Turkish interven-
tion in early 2020, France supports Greece 
and Cyprus and advocates a confrontational 
approach. This stance has similarities with 
Turkey’s, not least the emphasis on sover-
eignty, the display of military might and 
increased defence spending. Greece’s pur-
chase on 14 September of French weaponry 
and France’s joint military exercises with 
Greece, Italy and Cyprus are cases in point. 
French President Emmanuel Macron sees 
the creation of Pax Mediterranea as providing 
new grounds for political cooperation over 
the Mediterranean and as crucial to halting 
Turkey’s “imperial fantasies”. 
Southern European states such as Italy, 
Spain and Malta seem to seek a balance 
between Pax Mediterranea and Turkey. 
Italy, for example, has conducted separate 
military drills in the Eastern Mediterranean 
not only with Greece and France but also 
with Turkey. In pursuit of its goal of energy 
diversification and mindful of the need to 
protect its economic and security interests 
in Libya, Rome carefully seeks to balance 
adherence to the EU’s internal solidarity 
principle and the maintenance of workable 
relations with Turkey. Meanwhile, both 
Spain and Malta expressed solidarity with 
Greece and Cyprus at the MED7 Corsica 
meeting in September. But at the same time 
they advocate a more reconciliatory ap-
proach to Turkey. Spanish banks, alongside 
French and Italian ones, are most exposed 
to Turkey’s economic woes, while Turkey 
and Malta cooperate on migration. 
Eastern European and Baltic states have 
their own strategic considerations, too. 
In general, a smooth relationship with Tur-
key – a long-standing NATO ally – is im-
portant since the alliance plays a crucial 
role in their national security. Some leaders 
have even established a personal friendship 
with President Erdogan. 
Germany, which is home to Europe’s 
largest Turkish diaspora and has strong 
economic ties with Turkey, is in favour of 
a dialogue-based approach to Ankara. Per-
haps unsurprisingly, Berlin initiated media-
tion efforts between Turkey and Greece in 
August. 




Between Confrontation and 
Rebuilding Trust 
Member States tend to approach their rela-
tions with Turkey on the basis of their 
national interests and shape their stance at 
the EU level accordingly. It is imperative 
that the EU pursue a careful balancing act 
between confronting Turkish unilateralism 
and preventing bilateral tensions from 
determining policymaking at the EU level. 
Owing to the current stalemate in EU-
Turkey relations, reconciliation is difficult, 
if not impossible, at present. Since the 
1 October EUCO conclusions, there have 
been several alarming developments, such 
as Mr. Erdogan’s call for a boycott of French 
products during the spat with France over 
Islam; the decision to open Varosha, an 
abandoned southern quarter of the Cypriot 
city of Famagusta, which fell under Turkish 
control during the 1974 Cyprus invasion; 
and Mr Erdogan’s recent call for a two-state 
solution in Cyprus. All this has only con-
tributed to the existing stalemate. 
Still, certain steps could be taken to pre-
vent further deterioration. The EU should 
signal to Turkey that its claims in the East-
ern Mediterranean, particularly those over 
Kastellorizo and the distribution of energy 
resources, have been heard. At the same 
time, it should continue insisting that Tur-
key abide by international law. Reviving a 
discussion about areas of cooperation and 
their scope conditions could further help to 
improve the functioning of foreign policy. 
The EU could also use various economic 
instruments to pressure Turkey, such as lim-
iting IPA funds and Turkish participation in 
EU programmes or launching inquiries into 
disputable trade practices under the current 
Customs Union agreement. And while sanc-
tions are always available as a tool, effec-
tiveness would very much depend on scope. 
Even though the official suspension of 
membership talks might appear an attrac-
tive option, it would not necessarily be in 
the long-term interests of the EU. Given 
the decreasing vote share of the ruling 
AKP/MHP and the increasingly visible cracks 
within that alliance, the EU should keep 
membership talks as a normative instru-
ment for the future – if and when Turkey 
begins to pursue democratic repair. 
Besides instruments directly targeting 
Turkey, there is also the larger question of 
peace-building in the EU’s southern neigh-
bourhood, especially since the Eastern 
Mediterranean has become a playground 
for multiple proxy wars and a battlefield for 
reconfiguring the status quo in the MENA 
region. The militarization of foreign policy, 
though not unique to Turkey, seems to be 
both the catalyst and the consequence of 
this power rivalry. Decision-makers within 
the EU should take into account the regional 
dimension of the Eastern Mediterranean 
crisis when considering policies with which 
to confront Turkey. Given that defence 
capability is one of the prerequisites (albeit 
insufficient in itself) for the militarization 
of foreign policy, the EU could make more 
effective use of the instrument of arms 
embargo, including on dual-use materials. 
Sanctions against the defence industry is 
another instrument that the EU could con-
sider. At the same time, Member States 
should exercise caution about deploying 
arms sales to other actors as a tactical tool 
to counterbalance Turkey. 
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